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ABSTRACT 
Mobile  ad  hoc  network  (MANET)  is  a 
self-configuring  network  which  is  composed  of 
several  movable  mobile  nodes.  These  mobile 
nodes communicate with each other without any 
infrastructure. As wireless ad hoc networks lack 
an  infrastructure,  they  are  exposed  to  a  lot  of 
attacks. This paper analyzes the blackhole attack 
which  is  one  of  the  possible  attacks  in  ad  hoc 
networks. In a blackhole attack, a malicious node 
impersonates  a  destination  node  by  sending  a 
spoofed route reply packet to a source node that 
initiates  a  route  discovery.  By  doing  this,  the 
malicious node can deprive the traffic from the 
source  node.  In  order  to  prevent  this  kind  of 
attack, it is crucial to detect the abnormality that 
occurs  during  the  attack.  In  conventional 
schemes,  anomaly  detection  is  achieved  by 
defining  the  normal  state  from  static  training 
data. However, in mobile ad hoc networks where 
the network topology dynamically changes, such 
static  training  method  could  not  be  used 
efficiently. In this paper, we propose an anomaly 
detection scheme using dynamic training method 
in which the training data is updated at regular 
time  intervals.  The  simulation  results  show  the 
effectiveness  of  our  scheme  compared  with 
conventional scheme. 
 
Keywords: AODV, anomaly detection, blackhole 
attack, MANET 
 
1.  Introduction 
Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET) is a 
collection  of  mobile  hosts  without  the  required 
intervention  of  any  existing  infrastructure  or 
centralized access point such as a base station. Due 
to their inherent characteristics of dynamic topology 
and  lack  of  centralized  management  security, 
MANET is vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. 
Blackhole attack is one of many possible attacks in 
MANET. In this attack, a malicious node sends a 
forged  Route  REPly  (RREP)  packet  to  a  source 
node  that  initiates  the route  discovery  in  order  to 
pretend to be a destination node. By comparing the 
destination  sequence  number  contained  in  RREP 
packets  when  a  source  node  received  multiple 
RREPs, it judges the greatest one as the most recent  
 
 
 
 
routing information and selects the route contained 
in that RREP packet. In case the sequence numbers 
are equal it selects the route with the smallest hop 
count. If the attacker spoofed the identity to be the 
destination node and sends RREP with destination 
sequence  number  higher  than  the  real  destination 
node to the source node, the data traffic will flow 
towards  the  attacker.  Therefore,  source  and 
destination nodes are unable to communicate with 
each other. In [1], the authors investigated the effect 
of blackhole attack when movement velocity and a 
number  connection  toward  the  victim  node  are 
changed,  and  proposed  the  detection  technique  at 
the destination node. However, we  can effectively 
avoid the attack for example by selecting the detour 
route during route reconstruction which achieved by 
detecting the attack at the source node rather than at 
the destination node. Thus, taking into account the 
detection at the source node is indispensable. 
Regarding the detection of blackhole attack 
at the source node, [2, 3] have proposed methods in 
which still they are using the same training data to 
define the normal state. However, in MANET where 
the  network  state  changes  frequently,  the  pre-
defined normal state may not accurately reflect the 
present network state.   
In  this  paper,  we  use  a  reactive  routing 
protocol  known  as  Ad  hoc  On-demand  Distance 
Vector (AODV) routing [4] for analysis of the effect 
of  the  blackhole  attack  when  the  destination 
sequence  numbers  are  changed  via  simulation. 
Then,  we  select  features  in  order  to  define  the 
normal  state  from  the  characteristic  of  blackhole 
attack  [5].  Finally,  we  present  a  new  training 
method for high accuracy detection by updating the 
training  data  in  every  given  time  intervals  and 
adaptively defining the normal state according to the 
changing network environment. 
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  organized  as 
follows. Section II provides the background on the 
AODV protocol and describes the characteristic of 
the  blackhole  attack.  Section  III  analyzes  the 
blackhole attack through simulations. In Section IV, 
we propose the detection scheme of the attack, and 
evaluate its effectiveness. Section V concludes the 
paper. 
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2.  Overview On AODV 
AODV  is  a  reactive  routing  protocol  in 
which the network generates routes at the start of 
communication.  Each  node  has  its  own  sequence 
number  and  this  number  increases  when  links 
change.  Each  node  judges  whether  the  channel 
information is new according to sequence numbers 
[6]. Fig.1 illustrates the route discovery process in 
AODV. In this figure, node S is trying to establish a 
connection to destination D. First, the source node S 
refers  to  the  route  map  at  the  start  of 
communication. In case where there is no route to 
destination  node  D,  it  sends  a  Route  REQuest 
(RREQ)  message  using  broadcasting.  RREQ  ID 
increases  one  every  time  node  S  sends  a  RREQ. 
Node A and B which have received RREQ generate 
and renew the route to its previous hop. They also 
judge if this is a repeated RREQ. If such RREQ is 
received, it will be discarded. If A and B has a valid 
route  to  the  destination  D,  they  send  a  RREP 
message to node S. By contrast, in case where the 
node has no valid route, they send a RREQ using 
broadcasting.  The  exchange  of  route  information 
will be repeated until a RREQ reaches at node D. 
When node D receives the RREQ, it sends a RREP 
to node S. When node S receives the RREP, then a 
route is established. In case a node receives multiple 
RREPs, it will select a RREP who’s the destination 
sequence number (Dst Seq) is the largest amongst 
all previously received RREPs. But if Dst Seq were 
same, it will select the RREP whose hop count is the 
smallest. 
 
Figure. 1   Route discovery process 
 
 
Figure. 2   Transferring route error messages 
 
In  Fig.  2,  when  node  B  detects 
disconnection  of  route,  it  generates  Route  ERRor 
(RERR) messages and puts the invalidated address 
of  node  D  into  list,  then  sends  it  to  the  node  A. 
When  node  A  receives  the  RERR,  it  refers  to  its 
route map and the current list of RERR messages. If 
there was a route to destination for node D included 
in its map, and the next hop in the routing table is a 
neighboring  node  B,  it  invalidates  the  route  and 
sends a RERR message to node S. In this way, the 
RERR  message  can  be  finally  sent  to  the  source 
node S [7]. 
 
 
 
2.1 Description of Blackhole Attack 
In AODV, Dst Seq is used to determine the 
freshness  of  routing  information  contained  in  the 
message from originating node. When generating a 
RREP  message,  a  destination  node  compares  its 
current sequence number and Dst Seq in the RREQ 
packet plus one, and then selects the larger one as 
RREP’s  Dst  Seq.  Upon  receiving  a  number  of 
RREP, a source node selects the one with greatest 
Dst Seq in order to construct a route. To succeed in 
the blackhole attack the attacker must generate its 
RREP with Dst Seq greater than the Dst Seq of the 
destination node.  It  is  possible  for  the  attacker to 
find out Dst Seq of the destination node from the 
RREQ packet. In general, the attacker can set the 
value of its RREP’s Dst Seq base on the received 
RREQ’s Dst Seq. However, this RREQ’s Dst Seq 
may  not  present  the  current  Dst  Seq  of  the 
destination node.  Fig.  3  shows  an  example  of  the 
blackhole  attack.  The  value  of  RREQ  and  RREP 
using in the attack are shown in Table 1. 
 
Figure. 3 Blackhole attack 
 
Table 1: Values of RREQ and RREP 
 
 
In Table 1, IP.Src indicates the node which 
generates or forwards a RREQ or RREP, AODV.Dst 
indicates  the  destination  node  and  AODV.Src 
indicates the source node. Here, we assume that the 
destination node  D has no  connections  with  other 
nodes. The source node S constructs a route in order 
to  communicate  with  destination  node  D.  Let  the 
destination node D’s Dst Seq that the source node S 
has is 60. Hence, source node S sets its RREQ (a1) 
and broadcasts as shown in Table 1. Upon receiving 
RREQ (a1), node A forwards RREQ (b1) since it is 
not  the  destination  node.  To  impersonate  the 
destination  node,  the  attacker  M  sends  spoofed 
RREP(e1) shown in Table 1 with IP.Src, AODV.Dst 
the same with D and increased Dst Seq (in this case 
65  as)  to  source  node  S.  At  the  same  time,  the 
destination  node  D  which  received  RREQ  (b1) 
sends RREP (c1) with Dst Seq incremented by one 
to node S. Although, the source node S receive two 
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attacker M is judged to be the most recent routing 
information and the route to node M is established. 
As a result, the traffic from the source node to the 
destination node is deprived by node M. 
 
Next, we consider the case shown in Fig. 4. 
The value of RREQ and RREP using in Fig. 4 are 
shown in Table 2. Similar to Fig. 3, source node S 
attempts to construct a route to destination node D. 
However, unlike the environment in Fig. 3, in this 
case node B, C and E are also constructing a route to 
D. Therefore, the destination node D’s Dst Seq that 
the source node has is significantly different from 
the current Dst Seq of node D. Since the most recent 
Dst Seq from D that node S has is 60, it set RREQ 
(a2)  as  shown  in  Table  2  and  broadcasts.  Upon 
receiving  RREQ  (a2),  based  on  information 
contained in RREQ (a2) node M sends a spoofed 
RREP (e2) with Dst Seq 65 the same with previous 
situation to the source node. Upon receiving RREQ 
(b2) node D sends RREP (c2) to the source node. 
However, this time, since node D constructed route 
with  other  nodes,  we  assume  that  the  Dst  Seq  is 
increased to 70. Then, this RREP (d2) is forwarded 
by  node  A.  Upon  receiving  two  RREPs,  node  S 
selects the route to destination node D since the Dst 
Seq  of  node  D  is  the  larger  one.  As a result,  the 
attack is not succeeded [8].  
 
 
Figure. 4 Blackhole attack in some connections to 
nodeD 
 
Table 2: Values of RREQ and RREP 
 
 
3.  INVESTIGATION  OF  BLACKHOLE 
ATTACK 
  In this section, we investigate the effects of 
the blackhole attack in MANET using NS2 in our 
simulation [9]. Depending on the traffic involving in 
a destination node, its Dst Seq may change. As the 
recent,  in  the  blackhole  attack,  the  effect  of  the 
attack may also change depending on the increased 
amount of Dst Seq. Here, we specifically investigate 
the  effects  of  the  attack  when  the  number  of 
connections  to  the  destination  and  the  number  of 
connection from the destination are changed. 
3.1 Simulation Environment 
For  simulation,  we  set  the  parameter  as 
shown in Table 3.Random Waypoint Model (RWP) 
[10] is used as the mobility model of each node. In 
this model, each node chooses a random destination 
within the simulation area and a node moves to this 
destination with a random velocity. 
 
Table 3: Simulation parameters 
Here, we assume that the blackhole attack take place 
after  the  attacking  node  received  RREQ  for  the 
destination  node  that  it  is  going  to  impersonate. 
Upon receiving RREQ, the attacker set the Dst Seq 
of  RREP  to  RREQ’s  Dst  Seq  +  x.  Here,  x  is  an 
integer range form 1 to 30.The node number of each 
node  among  30  nodes  in  the  simulation  is  given 
from 0 to 29.  
 
3.2 Simulation Result of Blackhole attack 
First,  we  investigate  the  delivery  ratio  of 
packet from source node 0 to destination node 1 in 
case there are connections from other nodes to the 
destination node. For the experiment, nodes which 
are  selected  randomly  from  2  to  28  (except  the 
source node, destination node, and attacking node) 
generate traffic towards the destination node. Here, 
we perform experiment by changing the number of 
nodes generating the traffic from one to nine. This 
experiment is performed repeatedly five times. Fig. 
5  shows  the  packet  delivery  ratio  from node  0  to 
node  1.  From  Fig.  5,  we  can  see  that  when  the 
number  of  connection  is  1,  the  more  Dst  Seq  is 
increased  in  blackhole  attack  the  more  packet 
delivery ratio drops.  
However, when the number of connections 
increases,  the  packet  ratio  increases  even  when 
blackhole attack took place. 
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Figure.5  The  delivery  ratio  versus  the  number  of 
connec-tions to node 1 
   
This is because the destination node’s Dst 
Seq tends to be higher than the attacker’s Dst Seq, 
since attacker set the Dst Seq based on the Dst Seq 
contained in RREQ coming from the source node. 
We can see that the more the attacker increases the 
Dst Seq, the lower the packet delivery rate is. 
Next,  we  investigate  the  packet  delivery 
ratio from node 0 to node 1 when destination node 1 
generates  traffic  to  other  nodes.  We  assume  that 
destination  node  1  generates  traffic  toward  other 
nodes  in  which  their  node  numbers  are  randomly 
selected  from  2  to  28  as.  The  experiment  is 
performed  by  changing  the  number  of  selected 
nodes  from  one  to  ten  and  this  experiment  is 
repeated five times. Fig. 6 shows the packet delivery 
ratio from node 0 to node 1. 
When  the  number  of  connections  from 
node  1  increases,  in  other  words,  when  node  1 
initiates more route discoveries to other nodes, Dst 
Seq tends to be increased. For this reason, the packet 
delivery ratio increases along with the rising of the 
number of connections. From these results, we can 
judge  that  the  Dst  Seq  of  each  node  change 
depending on the condition of its traffic. 
 
 
Figure.6 : The delivery ratio versus the number of 
connec-tions from node 1 
4.  Detecting Blackhole Attack 
4.1. Feature Selection 
To  express  state  of  the  network  at  each 
node,  multidimensional  feature  vector  is  defined. 
Each dimension is counted up on every time slot. In 
order to detect this attack, the destination sequence 
number is taken into account. In normal state, each 
node’s sequence number changes depending on its 
traffic conditions. When the number of connections 
increases the destination sequence number tends to 
rise, when there are few connections it tends to be 
increased monotonically. However, when the attack 
took  place,  regardless  of  the  environment  the 
sequence number is increased largely. Also, usually 
the number of  sent out RREQ and the number of 
received  RREP  is  almost  the  same.  From  these 
reasons we use the following features to express the 
state of the network. 
– Number of sent out RREQ messages 
– Number of received RREP messages 
– The average of difference of Dst Seq in each time 
slot  between  the  sequence  number  of  RREP 
message and the one held in the list. 
 
Here, the average of the difference between 
the Dst Seq in RREQ message and the one held in 
the list are calculated as follows. When sending or 
forwarding a RREQ message, each node records the 
destination  IP  address  and  the  Dst  Seq  in  its  list. 
When a RREP message is received, the node looks 
over the list to see if there is a same destination IP 
address. If it does exist, the difference of Dst Seq is 
calculated, and this operation is executed for every 
received  RREP  message.  The  average  of  this 
difference is finally calculated for each time slot as 
the feature. 
 
 4.2.  Discrimination  Module  of  Anomaly 
Detection  
For the traffic that flow across each node, 
the network state in time slot i is expressed by three-
dimension  vector  xi  =  (xi1,  xi2,  xi3).  Here,  the 
groups  of  normal  states  are  considered  to  be 
gathered  close  in  feature  space.  In  contrast,  the 
abnormal state is considered to be the scattering data 
that  deviates  from  the  cluster  of  normal  state. 
According to this, the distribution of network state is 
shown. From now, we calculate the Mean vector     
from  Equation  (1)  using  training  data  set  D  of  N 
time slots. 
 
                   (1) 
 
Next,  we  calculate  the  distance  from  input  data 
sample x to the mean vector    from Equation (2). 
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When the distance is larger than the threshold   
(which means it is out of range as normal traffic), it 
will be judged as an attack (Equation (3)) 
 
                 (3) 
 
Here, the projection distance with maximum value 
is  extracted  as  Th  from  the  learning  data  set 
(Equation (4)): 
 
   (4) 
                                          i     xi D 
 
Let ∆T0 be the first time interval for a node 
participating in MANET. By using data collected in 
this  time  interval,  the  initial  mean  vector  is 
calculated, then the calculated mean vector will be 
used  to  detect  the  attack  in  the  next  period  time 
interval ∆T .If the state in ∆T is judged as normal, 
then  the  corresponding  data  set  will  be  used  as 
learning  data  set.  Otherwise,  it  will  be  treated  as 
data  including  attack  and  it  will  be  consequently 
discarded.  This  way,  we  keep  on  learning  the 
normal state of network. The procedure is shown in 
Fig.7. 
 
 
 
Figure.7  Learning flow chart of proposed method 
 
By doing this, we update the training data 
set to be used for the next detection. Then, the mean 
vector which is calculated from this training data set 
is used for detection of the next data. By repeating 
this  for  every  time  interval  ∆T,  we  can  perform 
anomaly  detection  which  can  adapt  to  MANET 
environments. 
 
4.3 Simulation Result 
We assume that initial training data set in 
time interval ∆T0 does not contain attack data, this 
interval is set to 300(s). Refer to [2, 3], we set the 
time  slot  i  to  be  5  (s).Here,  the  attacker  starts 
attacking after receiving a RREQ. The Dst Seq of 
RREP that the attacker sends is equal to the received 
RREP’s Dst Seq increased by x, where x is selected 
randomly  from  5  to  30.From  the  experiment,  the 
detection  rate  is  shown  in  Fig.  8,  and  the  false 
positive rate is shown in Fig. 9. The horizontal axis 
shows the mobility rate. Here, using initial training 
data only means that only initial data is used as the 
training data as in [2, 3].  
 
 
Figure. 8: Detection rate versus mobility rate 
   
From  these  results,  we  can  see  that  the 
detection ac-curacy drops as updating time interval 
increases.  We  can  also  see  that  it  is necessary  to 
shorten  the  updating  interval  as  the  mobility  rate 
become  faster.  However,  the  shorter  the  updating 
interval is the more processing overhead is needed. 
Therefore  more  battery  power  will  be  consumed. 
From these facts, it is necessary to take into account 
the MANET environment and battery power issue to 
determine the updating interval. In simulation, even 
if mobility rate become faster, detection accuracy of 
the  proposed  method  (∆T  =  300(s))  and  (∆T  = 
600(s)) are better than the using initial training data 
only 
 
 
Figure. 9: False positive rate versus mobility rate 
 
However,  the  detection  accuracy  of  the 
proposed method degrades when the updating time 
interval  become  longer.  Comparing  the  proposed 
method (∆T = 600(s)) with  
using  initial  training  data  only,  we  found  that  the 
average detection rate is increased by more than 8% 
and the average false positive rate is decreased by 
more than 6%.From this result, we can see that the Ms A.Naveena, Dr. K.Rama Linga Reddy / International Journal of Engineering Research and 
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detection  rate  and  false  positive  rate  has  been 
improved. In the proposed method, by updating the 
training  data  it  can  adapt  to  the  changing 
environment in MANET, while using initial training 
data only using only the initial training data can not 
adapt  to  the  dynamically  changing  environment. 
Therefore, we can see that the proposed scheme is 
effective in anomaly detection [11]. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Blackhole  attack  is  one  of  the  most 
important  security  problems  in  MANET.  It  is  an 
attack  that  a  malicious  node  impersonates  a 
destination  node  by  sending  forged  RREP  to  a 
source  node  that  initiates  route  discovery,  and 
consequently deprives data traffic  from the source 
node. In this paper, we have analyzed the blackhole 
attack and introduced the feature selection method 
in order to define the normal state of the network 
[12].  We  have  presented  a  new  detection  method 
based  on  dynamic  learning  and  updating  training 
data.  Through  the  simulation,  our  method  shows 
significant effectiveness in detecting the blackhole 
attack. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1]  H.  Deng,  W.  Li,    and  D.  P.  Agrawal,   
“Routing  security  in  ad  hoc  networks,” 
IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 40, 
no. 10, pp. 70-75, Oct. 2002. 
[2]   Y. A. Huang, W. Fan, W. Lee, and P. S. 
Yu, “Crossfeature analysis for detecting ad-
hoc  routing  anomalies,”  in  the  23rd 
International  Conference  on  Distributed 
Computing Systems (ICDCS’03), pp. 478-
487, May 2003. 
[3]  Y. A. Huang and W. Lee, “Attack analysis 
and detection for ad hoc routing protocols,” 
in  the  7th  International  Symposium  on 
Recent  Advances  in  Intrusion  Detection 
(RAID’04),  pp.  125-145,  French  Riviera, 
Sept. 2004. 
[4]  C. E. Perkins, E. M. B. Royer, and S. R. 
Das, Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector 
(AODV) routing, RFC 3561, July 2003. 
[5]  M. A. Shurman, S. M. Yoo, and S. Park, 
“Black  hole  attack  in  wireless  ad  hoc 
networks,”  in  ACM  42
nd  Southeast 
Conference  (ACMSE’04),  pp.  96-97, 
Apr.2004. 
[6]  M.S.Alkatheiri,    Jianwei  Liu,  A.R.Sangi, 
“AODV  routing  protocol  under  several 
routing  attacks  in  MANETs,”  13th 
International  Conference  on 
Communication  Technology  (ICCT),pp 
614-618, Aug.2011. 
[7]  W. Wang, Y. Lu, and B. K. Bhargava,  “On 
vulnerability and protection of ad hoc on-
demand  distance  vector  protocol,”  in  the 
10th  International  Conference  on 
Telecommunications  (ICT’03),  vol.  1, 
pp.375-382, French Polynesia, Feb.  2003. 
[8]  K.A.  Jalil,Z.Ahmad,J-L.A.Manan, 
“Securing Routing Table update in AODV 
routing  protocol,”  in  International 
Conference  on  Open  Systems  (ICOS),  pp 
116 -121, Sep. 2011. 
[9]  P.K.  Singh,  G.  Sharma,  “An  Efficient 
Prevention  of  Black  Hole    Problem  in 
AODV  Routing  Protocol  in  MANET,”  in 
11th  International  Conference  on  Trust, 
Security  and  Privacy  in  Computing  and 
Communications (TrustCom), pp 902 - 906 
,Apr. 2012. 
[10]  C. Bettstetter, G. Resta, and P. Santi, “The 
node distribution of the random  waypoint 
mobility  model  for  wireless  ad  hoc 
networks,”  IEEE  Transactions  on  Mobile 
Computing,  vol.  2,  no.  3,  pp.  257-269, 
Jul./Sep. 2003. 
[11]  U. Venkanna, R. Leela Velusamy, “Black 
hole attack and their counter measure based 
on trust management in manet:A survey,” 
in  3rd  International  Conference  on 
Advances  in  Recent  Technologies  in 
Communication and Computing (ARTCom 
2011), pp 232 -236, Sep. 2011. 
[12]  Jiwen Cai, Ping Yi, Jialin Chen, Zhiyang 
Wang, Ning Liu, “An Adaptive Approach 
to Detectng Black and Gray Hole attacks in 
Ad  hoc  Network,”  in  24th  IEEE 
International  Conference  on  
Advanced  Information  Networking  and 
Applications  (AINA),  pp  775  –  780,  Apr. 
2010. 